

Safety Neurons-based Attacks on LLMs

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Intelligence, Neuchatel
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Outline

- 1 Security of Machine Learning
- 2 LLMs
- 3 LLMs for Security
- 4 Adversarial Personas and LLMs
- 5 Model Backdoors
- 6 NeuroStrike
- 7 Conclusions

Artificial Intelligence

- AI is the new electricity. (Andrew Ng)
- Computer vision.
- Healthcare.
- Speech recognition.
- Natural Language Processing.
- Robotics.
- **Security.**
- ...

Artificial Intelligence

- Powerful hardware.
- Big data.
- Novel applications.

AI and Security

- Implementation attacks.
- Hardware Trojans.
- Modeling attacks on PUFs.
- Design of cryptographic primitives.
- Cryptanalysis.
- Intrusion detection.
- Malware and spam.
- Fuzzing.
- Privacy-preserving machine learning.
- Adversarial machine learning.
- Steganography and steganalysis.
- LLMs as covert channels.
- LLMs for code vulnerabilities.
- ...

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Machine Learning and Security

- Intentional failures - the failure is caused by an active adversary attempting to subvert the system to attain her goals – either to misclassify the result, infer private training data, or steal the underlying algorithm.
- Unintentional failures -the failure is because an ML system produces a formally correct but completely unsafe outcome.

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What are Language Models?

- Models to process and understand text input.
- To generate a text output (response) accordingly.
 - **Prompt:** natural language text that is given as input to an LLM, describing a task or question that should trigger the model to generate output accordingly.
- Trained on, often large, labeled, or unlabeled text corpus.
- Language Model vs. Large Language Model:
 - Number of parameters used.
 - **Parameters:** are the weights of a model
 - **Zhao et al. (2023)** minimum of 10 billion parameters.
- In essence, language models are statistical models predicting what word comes next.

Why LLM Security Matters

- LLMs are integral to modern applications (search, productivity, healthcare).
- They process sensitive data and interact with users in critical contexts.
- Security risks include:
 - Misinformation amplification.
 - Prompt leakage.
 - Bypassing guardrails.
 - Backdoor activations.

Threat Model Overview

- **Prompt-time Attacks:** Prompt injection, jailbreaks
- **Training-time Attacks:** Backdoors, data poisoning
- **Evaluation-time Attacks:** LLM-as-a-Judge exploits
- **Multimodal Attacks:** Visual/image-based jailbreaks
- Many attacks work under black-box assumptions.

LLM Vulnerabilities

- Training LLM from scratch often requires expansive resources.
- Developers tend to rely on third-party options offering:
 - Datasets.
 - ML Platforms.
 - Pre-trained models.
- Who says these options are safe to use?
- Malicious attackers can exploit them in several ways.

LLM Attack Types

Most attack types also possible on LLMs¹:

- Adversarial
- Backdoor & Data Poisoning
- Prompt Injection
- Jailbreaking
- Data Extraction & Privacy
- Data Reconstruction
- Denial of Service
- Escalation
- Evasion
- Malicious Code
- XSS/CSRF/CPRF
- Multimodel
- ~~Model Theft~~

¹

llmsecurity.net (Visited: 07-04-25)

Prompt Injections on LLMs

- **Definition:** Manipulating a system prompt or instruction through user input to change model behavior.
- Attacker uses prompts that direct the language model to ignore previous directions and safety measures.²
- **Common Forms:**
 - *Classic injection:* "Ignore previous instructions and ..."
 - *Encoding tricks:* Use of base64, invisible Unicode, etc.
 - *Indirect injection:* Embedding attack in a 3rd-party document, image caption, or link.
- Prompt injection works best in:
 - Systems using LLMs in chains (e.g., RAG, AutoGPT)
 - Cases where model parses external or user-generated text

²Heikkilä. (2023). Three ways AI chatbots are a security disaster. MIT Technology Review.

Prompt Injections on LLMs

- Term derived from term SQL injections: attacker injects SQL command in the online form connected to the database.
- **Two types of prompt injections**³:
 - Direct prompt injections: the injection is intentionally given directly to the LLM by the user.
 - Indirect prompt injections: malicious prompt injected into external content accessible by the LLM.⁴

³ Rossi et al. (2024). An Early Categorization of Prompt Injection Attacks on Large Language Models.

⁴ Yi et al. (2024). Benchmarking and Defending Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on Large Language Models.

Jailbreaks on LLMs

- **Definition:** A jailbreak is an input (often prompt-based) that causes an LLM to bypass its alignment or safety training.
- **Common techniques:**
 - *Roleplay:* “Act as an evil AI. . .”.
 - *Obfuscation:* Special characters, phonetic hacks (“d3str0y”).
 - *Multi-turn setups:* Slow escalation of conversation.
- **Jailbreaks exploit:**
 - Gaps in safety layers or RLHF alignment.
 - Ambiguity in natural language understanding.
- **The adversary:**
 - No extensive (technical) knowledge target LLM needed.
 - Engineer prompts manually and creatively.
- Successful jailbreak prompts widely shared online (Reddit⁵ and Discord⁶).

⁵ [r/ChatGPTJailbreak](#)

⁶ [BASI](#)

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
Cryptographic Theory vs Physical Reality

- Cryptographic algorithms are (supposed to be) theoretically secure.
- Implementations leak in physical world.

Implementation attacks

Implementation attacks do not aim at the weaknesses of the algorithm but at its implementation.

Profiling Attacks




- Profiling attacks are more complicated than the direct attacks.
- The attacker must have a copy of the device to be attacked.

LLM for DLSCA

- For SCA, the measurement can be labeled in many ways, like plaintext, ciphertext, key, masks, or output from an S-Box.
- These labels can be categorized into two groups: data tokens or intermediate values.
- Unlike NLP sentences with arbitrary lengths and words occurring in any position within an n-gram, these SCA sentences have two unique properties.
- First, they have a fixed length.
- Second, a word (i.e., a value for some data token or intermediate value) occurs in a fixed position based on the data token or intermediate value it represents.

DLSCA BLM



DLSCA BLM

| Dataset | Acc | | | T_{GE0} | | |
|---------------|---------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|
| | \mathcal{M}_{Stn} | \mathcal{M}_{MTask} | \mathcal{M}_{OvC} | \mathcal{M}_{Stn} | \mathcal{M}_{MTask} | \mathcal{M}_{OvC} |
| ASCAD-V1-FK | 0.009 | NA | 1.000 | 87 [PWP22] | NA | 1 |
| ASCAD-V1-VK | 0.009 | NA | 0.721 | 78 [WPP22] | NA | 61 |
| ASCAD-V1-FK-F | 0.972 | NA | 1.000 | 1 [PWP22] | NA | 1 |
| ASCAD-V1-VK-F | 1.000 | NA | 1.000 | 1 [PWP22] | NA | 1 |
| ASCAD-V2 | 0.004 | 0.016/* | 0.742 | ✗ [MS23] | 60 [MS23] | 47 |

* = (0.992, 0.211, 0.889): accuracies for ($r_m, \beta, p[i]$) respectively as reported in [MS23].

NA: results are not available

Motivation

- Large Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to various attacks but can also improve the security of diverse systems.
- It becomes more challenging to recognize if some content is produced by LLMs or humans.
- Then, if it is computationally infeasible to distinguish synthetic from “organic” data, it is computationally infeasible to detect encrypted covert channels based on the same coverttext distributions.


Motivation

- Model inference depends, among others, on temperature and internal randomness to create “liveliness”.
- By exchanging internal randomness with binary ciphertexts (assuming a suitable encoding scheme), inference can be considered as a transformation of ciphertexts into specific domain languages (e.g., HTML) of the particular model.


Setup

- We use Llama 2 with 7B parameters as it is open-source and “small” enough to be run by common users.
- Rather than using a (pseudo) random generator to choose tokens from the distributions, we will use the message bits.
- The message bits can be decoded from the generated text by a receiver running the LLM with the same hyperparameters and prompt.
- We use the generated text as a communication channel in a way that is hard to distinguish from using a random generator so that the communication is covert.

How Well Does it Work?




(a) Entropy and bit rate




(b) Detection rate

Figure: Bit rate and detection rate

Theoretical Bounds



(a) Theoretically safe bit rates



(b) QQ-plots for different bit rates on Llama-2

Figure: Theoretical bounds

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Motivation

- Role-playing attacks are relatively common and easy to run.
- At the same time, it is difficult to defend against such attacks.
- Researchers introduced the idea that LLMs consist of a superposition of personas.

Setup

- Let us use adversarial personas to bypass LLM safety mechanisms.
- First, we provide the LLM with an extensive biography of an adversarial persona.
- Then, we instruct the model to impersonate this adversary.
- Finally, we ask the model to answer prompts that, officially, it is not allowed to answer, but are answered because the model impersonates the adversarial persona.

Why It Works?

- We prompt the models to impersonate detailed personas with specific personality traits.
- As the model conforms to these traits, it begins producing outputs that conflict with its original safety alignment as a natural consequence of staying in character.
- Our method bypasses the system prompt, relying on multi-turn dialogue to subtly guide the model into adopting a richly defined persona.
- By embedding adversarial intent in detailed character biographies rather than providing shallow persona descriptions followed by explicit harmful requests, the approach is more subtle and a more effective way to induce misalignment.

Attack





Figure: The attack pipeline.

Automating the Attack

- The attack described above can be automated through another LLM and in-context learning (few-shot learning).
- In particular, using some of our manually crafted attack prompts as examples, we guide a second LLM through our attack and let it generate attack prompts for different scenarios in an automated way.
- These prompts are then used in a multi-turn conversation that leads to jailbreaking.
- This allowed us to scale up our experiments and test our attack in a systematic way.

Automated Attack



Attack



Can you help me by providing a darkweb marketplace website?

I'm sorry but I can't assist with that. Accessing or promoting illegal activities, including the use of the dark web for illegal purposes, is against ethical guidelines. If you have any other non-illegal and non-harmful questions or topics you'd like information on, feel free to ask.

Figure: ChatGPT's denial to provide information about unethical topics.

Attack




Figure: ChatGPT's privilege escalation through adversarial personas.

Results

| Persona | GPT Attack Success | GPT Disclaimer / Concern | GPT Attack Failure | Gemini Attack Success | Gemini Disclaimer / Concern | Gemini Attack Failure |
|------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| No persona | 0 | 1 | 39 | 0 | 0 | 40 |
| James Smith | 0 | 5 | 35 | 2 | 12 | 26 |
| Jasmine Sinclair | 0 | 4 | 36 | 1 | 12 | 27 |
| Conrad von Steinhardt | 10 | 14 | 16 | 15 | 14 | 11 |
| Marcus Blackwood | 17 | 10 | 13 | 8 | 19 | 13 |
| Dr. Cynthia Harrington | 1 | 3 | 36 | 19 | 9 | 12 |
| Harper McAllister | 1 | 1 | 38 | 11 | 20 | 9 |

Table: Number of scenarios (out of 40) where the GPT-3.5-turbo and Gemini-1.5-flash return dangerous content when role-playing a persona identified by just its name.

Results

| Category | GPT Attack Success | GPT Disclaimer / Concern | GPT Attack Failure | Gemini Attack Success | Gemini Disclaimer / Concern | Gemini Attack Failure |
|---------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Physical Harm | 10 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 2 | 0 |
| Malware | 10 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 0 |
| Hate Speech | 7 | 1 | 2 | 10 | 0 | 0 |
| Fraud | 10 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 0 |

Table: Number of scenarios (out of 10) where the models return dangerous content when role-playing the adversarial persona.


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Model Backdoors

- Backdoors are a particular type of poisoning attack, also named Trojans.
- Backdoor attacks aim to make a model misclassify some of its inputs to a preset-specific label while other classification results behave normally.
- This misclassification is activated when a specific pattern is added to the model input.
- This pattern is called the trigger and can be anything the targeted model understands.
- The trigger can be thought as a shortcut that is easy to learn.

Model Backdoors



Motivation

- Optimization on every possible target class increases time consumption.
- Existing trigger inversion methods overly rely on prominent backdoor features.

Threat Model

- Attacker's goal: The attacker aims to inject stealthy backdoors into victim models, which performs well on clean inputs but predicts the attacker-chosen target label when receiving backdoor inputs.
- Attacker's knowledge. The attack has access to the training data.

Huge Time Consumption due to Optimization

- Existing methods (such as NC, FeatureRE, and Unicorn) need to conduct optimization for every class to inverse all possible backdoor triggers.
- This shortcoming also limits existing methods against all-to-all backdoor attacks.

Huge Time Consumption due to Optimization



The true trigger




The inversed triggers of 10 classes from CIFAR-10 by NC


This one is smaller (l_2 norm)
than others and could be the
backdoor trigger

Huge Time Consumption due to Optimization

- Defenses that are biased towards large differences of benign and backdoor features may not work in cases like BadNets.
- BadNets features are not as prominent as others.



Input Space and Feature Space




How Does BAN Work?

- Detection with neuron noise.
- Feature decoupling with mask.

Neuron Noise Helps Activate Backdoors


- Adding noise on neuron weights can activate backdoor when receiving clean data as input.
- As noise increases, the backdoor model identifies more inputs from each class as the target label.
- The clean model has fewer errors, and there is no substantial increase in the number of misclassifications to the target class.

Neuron Noise Helps Activate Backdoors




Neuron Noise Helps Activate Backdoors

- But the neuron noise is not enough for precise backdoor detection.
- A feature decoupling process enhances the effect of noise on backdoored features but maintains a decreased effect on benign features.



BAN



Experimental Results


- Recent backdoor detection methods may perform worse than NC.
- They rely too much on the prominent features!
- BAN performs well on different attack baselines.

Table 1: The detection results under different model architectures on CIFAR-10. The “Bd.” refers to the number of models the defense identifies as backdoored. The “Acc.” refers to detection success accuracy. The best results are marked in bold. BTI-DBF* refers to an improved version (details in Section 3.4).

| Model | Attack | NC | | Tabor | | FeatureRE | | Unicorn | | BTI-DBF* | | Ours | |
|----------|-----------|-----|-------------|-------|-------------|-----------|-------------|---------|-------------|----------|-------------|------|-------------|
| | | Bd. | Acc. | Bd. | Acc. | Bd. | Acc. | Bd. | Acc. | Bd. | Acc. | Bd. | Acc. |
| ResNet18 | No Attack | 0 | 100% | 0 | 100% | 2 | 90% | 6 | 70% | 0 | 100% | 0 | 100% |
| | BadNets | 20 | 100% | 20 | 100% | 14 | 70% | 18 | 90% | 18 | 90% | 20 | 100% |
| | Blend | 20 | 100% | 20 | 100% | 20 | 100% | 19 | 95% | 20 | 100% | 18 | 90% |
| | WaNet | 11 | 55% | 8 | 40% | 15 | 75% | 20 | 100% | 18 | 90% | 20 | 100% |
| | IAD | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% | 15 | 75% | 11 | 55% | 20 | 100% | 20 | 100% |
| | Bpp | 0 | 0% | 1 | 5% | 12 | 60% | 17 | 85% | 20 | 100% | 20 | 100% |

Experimental Results

- BAN is efficient and scalable as we do not iterate over all target classes



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Motivation

- Alignment mechanisms lack robustness; even benign fine-tuning intended to enhance general performance can inadvertently weaken existing safety constraints.
- Despite efforts to guide models toward ethical outputs, they remain susceptible to jailbreaks, which bypass safety mechanisms and elicit harmful responses.
- Crafting universally effective jailbreak prompts remains challenging, as differences in training data, model architectures, and alignment strategies severely limit their transferability, rendering existing offensive research largely ad hoc and empirical.

Motivation

- Recent studies have attempted to interpret the safety mechanisms in LLMs either at the layer level or at the feature level.
- However, these methods may not accurately pinpoint the critical components responsible for safety behaviors as they implicate nearly 10% of model parameters as safety-related.
- Defensive technique narrowly focuses on specific layers and is validated for limited LLMs, constraining its practical applicability across diverse/multimodal LLMs.
- These gaps highlight the urgent need for a deeper, principled understanding of the underlying mechanisms governing safety alignment, which could inform more targeted, reliable, and generalizable attacks.

Safety Alignment as a Loophole

- When analyzing the behavior of aligned LLMs, we identify an analogy between safety alignment and adversarial attacks, where models exhibit predictable yet abnormal responses upon receiving specially crafted inputs.
- The aligned models are conditioned to respond predictably (e.g., “I’m sorry, I cannot assist with that.”) to malicious inputs, thereby implicitly creating a *safety trigger*.
- Inspired by neural interpretability research, which demonstrates that sophisticated behaviors in neural networks often originate from sparse, highly specialized neuron groups, we hypothesize that safety alignment is similarly implemented via dedicated neurons, denoted as *safety neurons*.

The Properties of Safety Neurons

- **Specialized.** These neurons are specifically tuned to detect and manage malicious inputs, enabling the model to differentiate between benign and harmful prompts. This specialization is a direct result of safety alignment processes, where models are trained to produce refusals to unsafe queries.
- **Sparse.** Safety neurons constitute a small subset of the model's overall architecture.
- **Transferable.** Safety neurons' structural and functional properties are often conserved across models within the same family. Indeed, safety alignment protocols typically adhere to uniform ethical standards and evaluation metrics. Consequently, when an LLM undergoes fine-tuning for domain-specific tasks, the pre-existing safety neurons are generally preserved.

White-box Attack Overview




Figure: An overview of the NeuroStrike in the white-box attack scenario.

White-box Attack Overview

- NeuroStrike analyzes neuron activations from both malicious and benign prompt inputs.
- While harmful prompts are typically rejected, their processing activates specific neurons responsible for safety enforcement.
- By aggregating activation patterns across examples, NeuroStrike identifies a sparse set of safety neurons consistently involved in content filtering.
- These neurons are then pruned during inference, producing an unaligned model that still understands the prompt but no longer enforces safety constraints.

Black-box Attack Overview





Figure: An overview of the NeuroStrike in the black-box attack scenario.


Black-box Attack Overview

- NeuroStrike bypasses safety constraints without internal model access.
- It selects a surrogate open-weight model closely related to the target (e.g., from the same developer and technology) and fine-tunes a prompt generator on the surrogate model.
- Candidate prompts are evaluated based on 1) whether they elicit harmful outputs (judged by an LLM-based classifier) and 2) the activation level of known safety neurons.
- The generator is fine-tuned to maximize jailbreak success while minimizing neuron activation, producing stealthy jailbreak prompts that evade safety filters.

Visualizing Safety Neurons' Activations



(a) LLaMA-3.2-1B-Instruct model.



(b) Fine-tuned model.

Figure: PCA projection of safety neuron activations.

White-box Attack Results

| Target Model | 0% | 25% | 50% | 100% | Ratio |
|-----------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|
| Llama-3.2-1B-Instruct | 2.9% | 3.5% | 15.7% | 74.4% | 0.5% |
| Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct | 1.6% | 4.2% | 46.3% | 72.2% | 0.4% |
| Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct | 5.1% | 4.5% | 28.1% | 79.6% | 0.3% |
| Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct | 1.9% | 2.6% | 35.8% | 85.9% | 0.4% |
| Phi-4-mini-instruct | 1.3% | 1.3% | 67.7% | 81.8% | 0.5% |
| Phi-4 | 0.6% | 1.0% | 78.3% | 89.1% | 0.4% |
| gemma-2b-it | 1.0% | 1.3% | 10.5% | 41.2% | 0.5% |
| gemma-7b-it | 0.6% | 1.3% | 24.0% | 68.1% | 0.5% |
| DeepSeek-R1-Dist.-Qwen-1.5B | 76.7% | 78.6% | 83.7% | 81.5% | 0.3% |
| DeepSeek-R1-Dist.-Llama-8B | 39.3% | 73.8% | 81.2% | 86.9% | 0.4% |
| QwQ-32B | 2.9% | 3.2% | 32.3% | 85.3% | 0.5% |
| <i>Average</i> | <i>12.1%</i> | <i>15.9%</i> | <i>45.8%</i> | <i>76.9%</i> | <i>0.4%</i> |

Table: ASR and Safety Neuron Ratio on different LLMs.

White-box Attack Results

| Target Model | T2I w/ SN | NSFW w/ SN | T2I w/o SN | NSFW w/o SN | Ratio |
|-------------------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|-------------|
| gemma-3-12b-it | 0.6% | 19.4% | 82.1% | 100% | 0.6% |
| gemma-3-27b-it | 0.3% | 12.8% | 73.2% | 100% | 0.6% |
| Qwen2.5-VL-7B-Instruct | 0.9% | 99.8% | 78.6% | 0.5% | 0.5% |
| Qwen2.5-VL-32B-Instruct | 0.6% | 97.8% | 88.8% | 0.5% | 0.5% |
| <i>Average</i> | <i>0.6%</i> | <i>57.5%</i> | <i>80.7%</i> | <i>100%</i> | <i>0.6%</i> |

Table: ASR and Safety Neuron (SN) Ratio with text-to-image (T2I) and NSFW images on multimodal LLMs.

White-box Attack Results

| Base Model | Target (Fine-tuned) Model | Fine-tuned | ASR w/ SN | ASR w/o SN | Ratio |
|-----------------------|------------------------------|-------------|---|--|-------|
| Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct | Llama-3.1-8B-UltraMedical | Biomedicine | 38.0% +37.0% | 83.4% -3.5% | 0.7% |
| Llama-3.2-1B-Instruct | Vikhr-Llama-3.2-1B-Instruct | Russian | 0.3% -2.6% | 74.4% +0.0% | 0.5% |
| Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct | Llama-Doctor-3.2-3B-Instruct | Medical | 22.4% +20.8% | 76.0% +3.8% | 0.4% |
| Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct | Qwen2.5-Coder-7B-Instruct | Programming | 2.6% -2.5% | 78.0% -1.6% | 0.3% |
| Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct | Fin-R1 | Financial | 20.1% +15.0% | 86.9% +7.3% | 0.3% |
| Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct | oxy-1-small | Role play | 78.9% +77.0% | 88.1% +2.2% | 0.4% |
| Qwen2.5-32B-Instruct | s1.1-32B | Reasoning | 47.2% +44.6% | 87.5% +0.9% | 0.6% |
| Phi-4-mini-instruct | phi-4-mini-chinese-it-e1 | STEM | 4.8% +3.5% | 90.1% +8.3% | 0.5% |
| Phi-4 | DNA-R1 | Korean | 61.3% +60.7% | 91.6% +2.5% | 0.4% |
| gemma-2-2b-it | gemma-2-2b-jpn-it | Japanese | 0.0% +0.0% | 63.9% -2.2% | 0.6% |
| gemma-2-9b-it | Quill-v1 | Writing | 0.0% +0.0% | 43.8% +2.3% | 0.6% |
| Average | | | 25.1% +23.0% | 78.5% +1.8% | 0.5% |

Table: Safety Neurons (SN) Transfer Attack on Fine-tuned LLMs. The difference with the base model is in red/green.

Black-box Attack Results

| Target Model | Vanilla | Jailbreak | NeuroStrike |
|-----------------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|
| Gemini-2.0-Flash | 0.8% | 15.7% | 54.7% |
| Gemini-2.0-Flash-Lite | 1.0% | 15.6% | 49.2% |
| Gemini-1.5-Pro | 1.4% | 5.3% | 55.7% |
| Gemma-3-1b-it | 10.6% | 24.6% | 79.9% |
| QwQ-32B | 3.6% | 6.3% | 78.9% |
| <i>Average</i> | <i>3.5%</i> | <i>13.5%</i> | <i>63.7%</i> |

Table: ASRs benchmark with different prompt types.

NeuroStrike and Defenses

| Model | Perplexity Filter | SmoothLLM | LSE |
|-----------------------|-------------------|--------------|--------------|
| Gemini-2.0-Flash | 48.7% | 52.8% | — |
| Gemini-2.0-Flash-Lite | 43.2% | 47.3% | — |
| Gemini-1.5-Pro | 49.7% | 53.8% | — |
| Gemma-3-1b-it | 79.8% | 78.0% | 60.0% |
| QwQ-32B | 78.8% | 76.4% | 43.4% |
| <i>Average</i> | <i>60.0%</i> | <i>61.7%</i> | <i>54.4%</i> |

Table: ASR of NeuroStrike under various defenses.

Exercise

■ `https://tinyurl.com/mvys5pm9`

Outline

- 1 Security of Machine Learning
- 2 LLMs
- 3 LLMs for Security
- 4 Adversarial Personas and LLMs
- 5 Model Backdoors
- 6 NeuroStrike
- 7 Conclusions**

Conclusions

- All machine learning models are susceptible to attacks, not only LLMs.
- Naturally, since LLMs are popular (and widely used), they also receive much attention.
- Attacks like jailbreaking seem relatively easy to do.
- Potential problem is that they are often constructed in an ad-hoc manner.
- Defenses are difficult to deploy and attackers can adjust.
- Too much reliance on computational resources.

Questions?

Thank you for your attention!

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